Sunday, January 15, 2012

Was Kanu/NDP merger a ploy to destroy Kanu from the inside?



As the opposition was moving towards unity, Kanu-NDP was also consolidating into one homogeneous unit.
Soon after the previous General Election in 1997, the two parties started a loose alliance baptised ‘co-operation’, which gradually edged closer into a ‘partnership’, and then ultimately consumed into a ‘merger’ on March 18, 2002.
President Moi is sworn-in for the second term after the December 1997 General Election on January 1, 1998. [PHOTO: FILE/STANDARD]
Many would argue the urge for the opposition to unite may have been influenced, to a large extent, by the looming threat of the emergence of a strong ‘New Kanu’, formed out of the unholy marriage.
Whatever the case, it is true that having been humiliated at successive multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997, the opposition had been humbled enough to realise that either they ‘stick together to survive, or be hanged separately’, to use Kijana Wamalwa’s favourite words.
After President Moi was declared the winner of the 1997 elections despite the opposition having disputed the results, he was sworn-in at State House on January 1 1998.
Controversial elections
On the eve of the swearing-in, the dejected opposition contemplated unity in defeat, and planned to meet to conjure a massive popular protest at Uhuru Park, Nairobi.
Thus, it was agreed between the opposition groups, particularly the Democratic Party (DP) and the National Development Party (NDP) of Kibaki and Raila, respectively, to converge at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi at 8am on New Year day.
The author, then just elected an MP, was the first to arrive, closely followed by businessman Nginyo Kariuki, a loser in the just concluded elections in Kiambaa constituency.
At about 8.10am, Raila also arrived. It was not until about 10am that the newly-elected Kiambaa MP and close confidant of Kibaki, Njenga Karume, arrived.
Not only was the climate tense from the presence of the two perennial Kiambaa protagonists, but Njenga also brought the unexpected sad news that Kibaki, after all, would not come.
All this while, it was to emerge Kanu spin doctors were busy trying to reach out to sections of the defeated opposition fraternity, particularly members of Ford-Kenya.
After a few phone consultations, Raila decided to call off the planned demonstration when it was clear that as the opposition was haggling over what to do next, Moi’s handlers were busy at State House arranging his swearing-in, which understandably took place at about 11am.
NDP supporters, who had started assembling all this while outside the party offices at Agip House waiting to march to Uhuru Park, were promptly dispersed.
It may never be known to Kenyans what transpired thereafter, but one thing that is for a fact is that soon after, NDP leadership itself started warming up to Kanu.
It is believed Raila, former Kisumu Town West MP Job Omino (later to be Deputy Speaker during the last Kanu reign, and subsequently Narc Council Co-chairman), and one other senior NDP operative visited Moi at State House.
At this meeting, plans to ‘co-operate’ with Kanu were mooted.
When the ‘co-operation’ idea was first floated to the larger NDP membership, it sounded so noble – at least from the outside.
But as some say, the devil is in the detail! At the national level, the ‘co-operation’ had four stated main objectives: revival of the economy, occasioning the revival of the long-stalled constitutional reform, stemming insecurity and stamping out corruption.
It was such sweet music to the ears! At the regional level too, the ‘co-operation’ also had grand ideas.
This was to be since NDP after the elections had emerged purely a regional, nay tribal party with all but one of its elected MPs coming from or having their base in Nyanza.
The former Limuru MP George Nyanja and Raila were the only two voted in outside Luo-Nyanza.
That Raila’s base is in Nyanza is not in doubt, even though he has never contested a seat there. His traditional constituency, Lang’ata, is a Nairobi urban constituency.
It was not long before the Kanu/NDP co-operation was launched in February 1998 at the Homa Bay Stadium, with President Moi and Raila as joint chief guests, and the local MP being the host and master of ceremonies.
After what was a pretty successful rally, the entourage headed to Kisumu, receiving a rousing welcome at every stopping point along the way.
It was from Kisumu State Lodge that the team of the then Karachuonyo MP Adhu Awiti, former detainee Prof Edward Oyugi and the author were tasked to develop a memorandum of key development issues Nyanza considered its priority for tabling to the Moi government.
The group held intensive and extensive consultations with other key stakeholders, chief among them an academic think-tank of mainly University of Nairobi dons (later to become the ‘Nyanza Professional Caucus’) led by Dr George Outa.
In the end, five items were prioritised: revival of the cotton industry (including Kicomi Textiles Mills), sugar industry (including the possibility of establishing a new plant in Homa-Bay District), the molasses plant, providing electricity and establishing ice cooling plants at the fish-landing beaches along the Lake (Victoria), and tarmacking of a few selected roads in Central and Southern Nyanza.
Thus, the ideas were grand, and noble by any measure. Former Alego-Usonga MP and once Cabinet Minister, Peter Oloo Aringo, and the author soon broke away from the co-operation bandwagon when it emerged certain key members within the NDP leadership were more interested in personal or family gain, and not national or even regional gain.
It was not in doubt that soon after, offers of contracts, properties, appointments, etc from the Government became abundant. For those opposed, the contention was ‘why opt for appointments which at the stroke of a pen can be reversed, instead of a tarmac that cannot be scrapped even when the relationship turns sour?’
Besides, the appointments were rather skewed, with South Nyanza getting a definite raw deal, and Siaya District, specifically Bondo, getting certainly more than its fair share.
In the end, Aringo trooped back to the flock and was indeed the first NDP MP to cross the floor to the Government side when the ‘merger’ was finally consummated.
From then on, one thing led to another as NDP edged closer to Kanu.
Many romantic words were used at different stages to christen the alliance.
The ‘co-operation’ soon turned into a ‘partnership’, coming with it appointment of a few NDP MPs, including its leader, to the Cabinet.
When at last the two parties merged, or more precisely when NDP was dissolved and swallowed by Kanu to give birth to ‘New Kanu’, it was not in doubt who dictated the pace of politics in Kenya.
In an ensuing controversial party election, the hitherto heir apparent and Vice President George Saitoti, and former soul mate and Kanu Secretary General Joseph ‘JJ’ Kamotho, were edged out.
In Saitoti’s slot, four Vice Chairman’s positions were created, and he was not even one of them.
The writing was on the wall! He was later dropped from the vice presidency too! For Kamotho, his seat had to go to the ‘Premier-designate’ Raila Odinga.
Understandably, the Secretary General’s slot was simply a stopgap. The rest is history.
In all these, different commentators have given different interpretations, depending on their political whims and orientations.
One body of thought is that the Kanu/NDP alliance was a strategy to infiltrate and destroy Kanu from within, once and for all. This was the official explanation given by the NDP turned-LDP-turned-ODM brigade when they eventually bolted out of Kanu to join or team up with NAK to form Narc.
That Kanu was in the end given a final, fatal blow is true. However, there is the other school of thought that contends that Kanu being destroyed was more consequential and accidental, rather than pre-determined.
It further contends that the NDP brigades were simply driven by self-interest, and that it is only when it appeared they had been short-changed that a change of heart dawned on them.
Only the NDP maestro and God know the truth. What is certain is that as Kanu and NDP bonded further, the opposition realised increasingly that the only way to beat, or even scare Kanu was by them forging their own alliance, not only among themselves but also with other partners, most significantly civil society, the religious community, private sector and pro-reform donor groups.
Therefore, the Kanu/NDP relationship contributed somewhat towards the ultimate evolution of genuine engagement of pro-reform forces, particularly opposition unity.
Thus, when carefully selected opposition chiefs were approached by members of the PPF with a proposal for a structured unity plan, it was not surprising that they were all, without exception, warm to the idea.
Following experiences from attempts during the previous two multi-party elections to unite the opposition, and the earlier stated experiences of the NCEC and Mageuzi movements, and even more emboldened by the growing Kanu/NDP joint strength, it was an almost foregone conclusion that all reform-inclined forces had to unite to bring change, or mageuzi.
PPF, the main pro-reform think-tank group at the time, developed a five-tier approach to the much needed unity: the political leadership, civil society, non-secular or religious leadership, private sector (including professionals), and eventually, the ‘masses’.
At every stage of a tightly knit roadmap, a host of key stakeholders (institutions and individuals) were identified, consulted and eventually brought on board.
In the case of political leadership, it was felt that two distinct categories needed to be recognised and appropriately dealt with: those in Parliament, and those outside Parliament for one reason or the other, but nonetheless with a sizeable following.
Presidential ambitions
In either case, it was felt that the ideal thing to do was to identify all the key leading lights of every strategic caucus or group.
In the final analysis, a list of about ten key leaders who were potential presidential candidates in the upcoming elections was drawn.
It included Mwai Kibaki (then Leader of Official Opposition, DP), Simeon Nyachae (just having resigned from the Government to form and popularise his own party, Ford-People), the late Wamalwa Kijana (Chairman, Ford-Kenya), Charity Ngilu (just decamped from Social Democratic Party to form her own party, the National Party of Kenya, NPK), James Orengo (de facto leader of Mageuzi and Chairman of one faction of SDP), Prof Anyang’ Nyong’o (leader of the other SDP faction), Paul Muite (Safina Party leader), the late Kipkalya Kones and Kipruto arap Kirwa (both having only recently fallen out with mainstream Kanu, and the latter together with Cyrus Jirongo leading the United Democratic Movement).
One other prominent reform leader outside Parliament, Kenneth Matiba (leader of
Saba Saba Asili party, and he of the famous ‘Let the People Decide’ slogan) was also identified.
Though not in Parliament, having led a group of other potential MPs in boycotting the 1997 elections, there was no doubt as to the size of support he enjoyed particularly among the ‘men on the street’.
It is to be noted that whereas at inception of PPF, it was agreed that only those with no obvious presidential ambitions could be members, that the group’s
Co-convenor, Kipruto arap Kirwa, was later so identified was not inconsistent as the ambitions were not evident at the onset.
Indeed, two other members also ultimately declared interest in offering candidature: Beth Mugo and the author.
By that time, opposition unity had been so solidified and NAK had essentially taken over the reform agenda and leadership from PPF that it was no longer believed that mere declaration of presidential ambition would threaten the reform movement, and PPF in particular, in any significant way.
It should be noted that all through the various motions up to the election time, PPF remained in the background as the reform movement’s unofficial think-tank.
Once the 10 leading potential presidential candidates were identified in mid-2000, arrangements were made to approach them, first individually and later in turn. Between August and October 2000, they were all met at their own convenient time and place.
In principle, it was agreed by the PPF leadership that each would be visited or met by between three to five carefully and strategically selected PPF members.
Also based on previous experience whereby a leader would consent to an issue when confronted alone, but when they recede to their ‘kitchen cabinet’ (often a tribal cocoon), they reverse or otherwise vary their position, it was agreed that each leader would be met in the presence of two or three of their close confidants – also mutually negotiated and agreed in advance.
It was also agreed up-front that the main agenda would be to introduce the idea of a structured dialogue towards a united opposition to the leaders, and seek their concurrence.
If positive, they were also to be lobbied to support an all-inclusive roundtable meeting of all the identified ‘leaders’ at the end of the individual consultations.
Kanu infiltration
The first to have been met, naturally, was Kibaki. He hosted the PPF team in his office at Parliament Buildings, in the company of Njenga Karume, Matu Wamae, and Joseph Munyao.
The PPF team comprised the Convenor (who attended meetings with all the identified leaders, except the meeting held in Mombasa with Matiba), Co-convenor (Kirwa), Mukhisa Kituyi, Jimmy Angwenyi, and Dr Abdulahi Ali (who was later to be threatened out of the caucus).
The meeting was very successful, and quite inspiring. Kibaki and team wholly embraced the initiative, and they urged the group on.
Most significant, he told the group in his words: "People will discourage you that this initiative will not head anywhere, since opposition unity has been tried severally before, and failed. However, previous efforts were made last minute, about 3-6 months into elections, and at a time when people had already invested heavily in time and resources in strategising and electioneering. But your effort comes nearly one-and-a-half years (18 months) ahead of elections."
One other thing that impressed the Kibaki team was the diversity of the PPF caucus; it was both multi-ethnic, and multiparty.
Given, the five who called on the President-to-be were all from different regions of the country (and ethnic backgrounds), and from four different parties: NDP (Nyanza), UDM/Kanu (Rift Valley), Ford Kenya (Western), Ford People/Kanu (Kisii), and Kanu (North Eastern), respectively.
Armed with the endorsement by the Leader of Official Opposition, the group faced subsequent sessions with even more devotion and commitment, and with one resolve: to succeed.
The next meeting was with Nyachae. He hosted the delegation to a luncheon at the Nairobi Serena Hotel. His team included the late Kones, Henry Obwocha, and the late Enock Magara, who also dubbed up as part of the PPF team.
The other members of the PPF team were the Convenor, Co-convenor (Kirwa),
Waithaka Mwangi (Ford-People, Kinangop), and Moses Muihia (SDP,Gatundu South). Nyachae gave an equally encouraging response at the end of it all.
He was for a common reform front. However, he cautioned the group against possible infiltration by Kanu. One strategy he proposed to the group that was later to be used very effectively not only by PPF, but also eventually by Mageuzi and NAK/Narc was the layered cell system.
That there would be members in different cells, either as inner or outer circles! Information would be shared only on a need-to-know basis.
Thus, the ‘real insiders’ would be the only ones to know most, if not all, the plans and strategies. During the Mageuzi days, for example, there were among the ranks of the leading proponents people believed to be Kanu-moles. Such definitely would never be in any inner circle!
The next meeting, which was with Michael Kijana Wamalwa was as equally inspiring and interesting, but first there were fundamental things to be clarified, and reassurances to be given.
The PPF team had to ensure that Dr Kituyi was not part of its delegation: at that particular time, there was no love lost between Kituyi and his cousin-brother, Michael. Second, the Ford-Kenya Chairman had to be given the comfort that ‘this is not the Orengo, Mageuzi group’.
At that time, Orengo, who was until recently Ford-Kenya’s First Vice Chairman, had just resigned his position in the party. The once soul mates no longer had their souls so close any more.
Wamalwa, unlike the previous two, was seen alone, his right-hand man,
Musikari Kombo, having been out of town at the time.
In spite of the meeting being perhaps the most casual and brief of them all, held on the stone-wall seats around Parliament buildings, ‘Mike’ was most supportive and enthusiastic about it.
It is to be noted that Kituyi and Wamalwa were not the only opposition politicians whose relationships were strained; there were several others who could not see eye to eye. Ngilu could not talk to Nyong’o, them having just had a bitter break-up in SDP. Neither could Orengo and Nyong’o, both were intensely embroiled in the scramble for SDP’s leadership. Muite and Orengo, on the one hand, and Kibaki and his brigade on the other were equally miles apart.
Matiba had no time for any of these sitting MPs, possibly without exception.
The meeting with Ngilu was equally informal and easy. Probably, of all the leaders met, she more than any other embraced the spirit and letter of the unity framework.
Her commitment was to be witnessed all through the various negotiations, consultations, ‘breakfast meetings’, and several other activities that were to follow, that in the end bore fruit and drove the opposition into victory and power.
The subsequent meetings with the other identified leaders were similarly easy, and without any major incidence.
Except for one or two leaders who, whereas they welcomed the idea, were sceptical about the commitment and seriousness of the ‘principals’, the vast majority of them endorsed the efforts to unite the opposition, at least from the face of it. Strangely, even Matiba (and to some extent, Nyachae), reputed for his trademark uncompromising no nonsense stance, welcomed the idea.
Matiba was the only leader met by the PPF team outside Nairobi, specifically at one of his hotels in Mombasa.
Protracted dialogue
Angwenyi led the PPF delegation, which happened to have also been at the Coast at the same time on a different official parliamentary business.
Thus, at the end of it all, it emerged that the different major opposition leaders may have been strategising (or was it agonising) separately, but they all believed that the only way to deal Kanu a fatal blow was through a common opposition front, even though they each may have believed in different approaches, styles, timelines and actors.
It, therefore, proved relatively easier, in subsequent sessions, to lay the foundation and build bridges between and among some of the key players on the opposition benches.
It was not enough to merely talk to the opposition chiefs and get their concurrence. It was learnt that private bonding and confidence building between the various ‘principals’ was even more critical.
Mukhisa Kituyi and Kiraitu Murungi shared with pro-unity advocates the need for, and the failure of past initiatives to inculcate ‘bonding’.
That ‘breakfast meetings’ and retreats (also called ‘The Bundu’, a South African term) were to be a hallmark of the NAK/ Narc style was thus not surprising. Most of the obstacles were overcome in such behind the scene consultations.
When making serious deals with a key ‘principal’, it was vital not only to have a ‘witness’, but he or she would also be in the presence of a few key confidants.
In previous efforts, stories were told of how a principal would agree to an arrangement, only to change his mind the next day after caucusing with the ‘kitchen cabinet’.
Once a strategy was agreed by the PPF team, and broad consensus developed on a united front, it was proposed that an attempt be made to bring together the ten ‘principals’ earlier identified to a common roundtable meeting.
This proposal was, however, opposed by some sceptics, who reasoned that this protracted dialogue was increasingly becoming a waste of time.
This group, largely made of people who had been involved in and disillusioned by past similar efforts, contended that some of the principals were not sincere.
Most notable was Dr Kituyi, who even later on in the initiative did not seem to think much of it (at least in private), despite being considered a key player in PPF.
During a social evening outing at the Impala Club on Nairobi’s Ngong Road, he was reported to have told one of the signatories to the founding NAK MoU that ‘those opposition unity things will never go anywhere’.
It is to be noted, however, that one of the very few PPF parliamentary members who ever made any material contribution and regularly participated in PPF meetings and functions was Dr Kituyi!
After protracted discussions, it was resolved to host the first roundtable meeting nonetheless. The contention was that (like with Mageuzi rallies), even if the principals did not attend or take seriously the first meeting, if the group persisted, they would gradually start to pay attention.
To the group’s surprise, however, when the first such meeting was called in October 2000 at the Trisan Hotel in Kilimani area on the outskirts of Nairobi, nearly all the targeted leaders attended. The first meeting saw a galaxy of luminaries such as Kibaki, Ngilu, Orengo, Nyong’o, Kones, Kirwa, Kombo, Obwocha, Matu Wamae, Chris Murungaru, Kiraitu, Angwenyi, Wekesa, Katuku, and several other PPF MPs attend.
Even the two principals who were conspicuously absent – Nyachae and Wamalwa – had understandable reasons to be away.
They were both deep in campaigns for by-elections in South Mugirango and Kapenguria, respectively.
Nonetheless, they were sufficiently represented through their close key confidants. Apart from Matiba, who had not been invited to this particular meeting, Paul Muite was also absent.
It had earlier been agreed that within the political sector, sufficient bonding be first made between sitting MPs. Phase two would incorporate non-parliamentary political leaders.
Though he sent an apology, Muite appeared all through these efforts a reluctant, if not cautious ally. In private, he was very skeptical about these initiatives. However, whenever he met the PPF leaders, he was full of encouragement – measured encouragement though!
He never said ‘No’! But he also never said a clear ‘Yes’. Indeed, some believe that his close association with Orengo may have influenced the latter to back off from the unity efforts.
Nevertheless, buoyed with the success of this first roundtable meeting, the PPF Group never looked back. A series of meetings were subsequently held at Trisan, numbering about a dozen, before the ‘official’ meeting venue was changed to Silver Springs.
For about seven months, the group met at Trisan, away from public attention, media, and possibly the intelligence and security operatives.
Meeting venues
All over a sudden, a number of strange, weird-and-mean-looking people started to appear at Trisan during the group’s meetings.
It was from then decided to be changing and rotating meeting venues. As National Alliance Coalition/Narc matured and elections neared, meeting venues moved between Trisan, Silver Springs, and Milimani Hotel – believed to be owned by Narc’s first Comptroller of State House, Matere Keriri. In between, and once ample confidence had been built between the NAC/NAK principals, some meetings were also held at the respective party offices, especially DP’s and Ford-Kenya’s.
Looking back in history, one sees how far the opposition came: there was a time you could not expect to see a DP insider at Ford-Kenya offices, let alone attend a meeting.
As a neutral ground, therefore, Trisan played a very important role and will forever be remembered as the home of NAC/NAK.
The first meeting at Trisan, which was chaired by the PPF Convenor, was brief but very important. It set the mood and laid the ground for an all-opposition unity.
Member after another extolled their frustration with the Kanu leadership, and a lack of broadly accepted common opposition front.
They also all reaffirmed their desire to forge such an alliance without any pre-conditions or assumptions. In a nutshell, the main achievement of this first meeting was declaration of confidence of the process initiated by PPF, then seen as a genuine, independent, neutral and credible arbiter.
— Compiled by Isaac Ongiri
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