Kaihu na kwao

By John Githongo and David Ndii
Posted Saturday, July 17 2010 at 21:06

As we argued last week, Kenya’s primary governance problem is the Presidency.

Tribalism delivers power to an individual who then uses corruption to redistribute it to his kinsmen. Our politics is largely about manoeuvering yourself into a position to be able to “eat”. It has created the elite that rules Kenya.

To flourish in it you must mobilise along tribal lines. The system makes good men and women tribal barons. To lead Kenya, you must first lead your tribe.

In this article we consider the ramifications of either a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ outcome of the referendum for the current political leadership.

A ‘No’ vote

If ‘No’ prevails, as we argued last week, the winner would be the political status quo. This is familiar territory for the political class.

Ironically, it is not unlikely that, say, both ‘No’ political leader William Ruto and Mr Raila Odinga will be big beneficiaries.

Mr Ruto will emerge as the biggest Kalenjin political chief, and in essence succeed former President Moi. He would have consolidated the Kalenjin voting block as rigorously as Mr Odinga has the Luo one. He will be in a strong negotiating position with the PNU group with the security of the Gikuyu in the Rift Valley as his bargaining chip.

For Mr Odinga, a ‘No’ vote will portray him as having tried his best to bring about constitutional change but failed. His rapprochement with President Kibaki would conceivably have repaired some of the damage done to his GEMA relations.

However, this rapprochement is a double-edged sword, as it denies him the strategy of building an anti-Kikuyu coalition as he did in 2003, without necessarily delivering the Kikuyu vote. That said, a ‘No’ vote would allow him to focus on stitching together a formidable ethnic coalition for 2012.

On the PNU side the Kibaki succession will kick off in earnest. Going by its track record the PNU camp is unlikely to survive a leadership contest, more so if the wazees who have held the Kibaki regime together feel they have recouped their Moi era losses and choose to retire with him.

If it is unable to present a credible challenge to Mr Odinga, the insidious forces we spoke of last week will become despondent and may intervene in a variety of extrajudicial ways.

A ‘Yes’ vote

The proposed constitution provides for only two national political offices, the president and vice-president. The nature of politics is such that senior politicians — the minister class, many with presidential ambitions —will be loathe to downgrade to backbenchers, eclipsed by county governors and senators.

Many will contemplate running for senate and county governors. The mandates of these, however, are limited to county matters, that is, they will not provide a national platform as a ministerial position does.

One certainly welcome implication of the new system is that the nonstop campaigning, political realignment and manoeuvering that has become a feature of our politics since 1997 could become a thing of the past.

Back to the Presidency. Rather than tribal coalitions, the new system will require organised institutionalised national political parties — like the old Kanu — which currently none of the contenders have, and which is well nigh impossible to create in the two years to 2012.

This means politicians will have to scramble to find a way to do the tribal coalitions they are used to, with only two positions to play around with. It is not going to be easy.

There will be two currencies to negotiate with: ethnic blocks and money. Finance minister Uhuru Kenyatta would have both hence he would be in a strong negotiating position for the top job.

Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka has a sizeable ethnic block but not much money behind him — he would not be in a strong negotiating position with Mr Kenyatta.

If Mr Ruto consolidates the Kalenjin vote, he could get a fair amount of money behind him, which would give him a reasonable negotiating position with either Mr Musyoka or Mr Kenyatta.

Mr Odinga’s first headache will be to identify a running mate. Keeping Mr Musalia Mudavadi will leave the field open for his opponents to have a more balanced ticket of East-West, read Kalonzo-Uhuru-Ruto.

On the other hand, if he dumps Mr Mudavadi, he alienates the huge Luhya voting bloc. The new constitution will open up all political offices including the presidency to independent candidates. This has the potential to upset the tribal equations, much like the role Ross Perot played in the US election.

All these factors make it likely that the presidential race will not be won in the first round. A second round could go in surprising ways. The import of all this is that a ‘Yes’ vote will at once level the playing field for the 2012 election.

The coalition government is likely to take a big hit. With an uncertain future in national politics, there is little to bind the ministers to the principals, other than the positions they occupy between now and 2012. Those who opt for county or senate will shift their focus to their respective counties. It will be, as the Gikuyu say, the time to disperse; “kaihu na kwao” (every mongoose to his burrow).

Counter-reform

The draft constitution is the boldest attempt to reform our political system since independence. It will, if we pass it, activate counter-reform. It is not easy to predict what form the counter-reform will be, but we can make educated guesses where the theatres of action will be.

The first theatre will be the courts. We should not be surprised to see a flurry of legal challenges to the new constitution and bizarre judgments.

The second theatre is Parliament. Expect to see attempts to amend the new constitution, or other creative legislation intended to subvert it.
The third theatre is the bureaucracy.

This will entail dirty tricks that put sand in the wheels of implementation, ranging from budgetary shenanigans, delaying the work required, or making a deliberate mess of it.

Depending on how high the stakes will be for the potential losers, the ultimate counter reform strategy will be political destabilisation. The role of the security sector in this transition will be critical.