Saturday, August 15, 2015

Ruto's Rocky Path to State House

URP leader and Eldoret North MP William Ruto and TNA presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta during the 22nd December Jubilee alliance at Tononoka grounds. Photo/FILE
URP leader and Eldoret North MP William Ruto and TNA presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta during the 22nd December Jubilee alliance at Tononoka grounds. Photo/FILE
August 15, 2015
      
Kenya’s Deputy President William Samoei arap Ruto is daring the gods. He has declared his intention to run for President in 2022, effectively setting a rendezvous with fate in March that year. That is very courageous and risky. Seven years is eons in political time and too deep into the unknown future to game determinately. Ruto has also made his intentions clear to all – a sacrilege in politics, and an advance notice to foes. The most he can do now is to weight the dice in his favour by 'future-proofing' himself against known factors that will most likely determine whether he is President or not.

The ICC factor
First, is his case at the ICC. A conviction will summarily put paid to Ruto’s lofty ambitions. Every indication is that the prosecution’s case is wobbly. An inspired defence may well collapse it. This is, however, ICC judges’ call to make. In the meantime, Ruto must consider a clean win at the court an absolute priority. This is a do or die, all or nothing matter. If he is to be President, there is simply no other option.
The timing of the case’s conclusion matters too. The best scenario is an acquittal before 2018. It would strengthen his position as running mate to Kenyatta, and opens up options if he gets snubbed. Conclusion of the case after 2018 would delay his campaign.

The 'Uhuruto' factor
Ruto and his boss have strong personal chemistry and mutual respect. Each of them commands a substantial regional backing, which combined, makes the biggest voting bloc in the country. One needs the other. However, Kenyatta could arguably drop him as running mate in 2017, or keep him, but clip his wings after the election. Either scenario is highly risky for Kenyatta. If spurned as running mate, Ruto could run for President himself, and force a run-off or back another candidate. Conversely, if made uncomfortable in the second term, he could resign and launch his campaign outside Kenyatta’s shadow, perhaps starting with a drive for Kenyatta’s impeachment.
Late into his second term, however, this balance of power changes decisively in Kenyatta’s favour. Ruto needs Kenyatta’s endorsement for his 2022 candidacy. This means Kenyatta must also be comfortable, if not have a role in picking Ruto’s running mate. He also needs Kenyatta’s support in principle and deed to sway the Mt Kenya vote his way. If his strategy, as he has indicated, is to ride the Jubilee juggernaut to the Presidency, anything less would be a huge dent, and possibly a death knell to his campaign.

The Mt Kenya factor
Jubilee is only viable as a vehicle to the Presidency if Mt Kenya and Rift Valley overwhelmingly vote for one candidate. This happened in 2013. It will need to happen in 2017 for Kenyatta to secure a second term. Will it happen for the third time and safely carry Ruto to the Presidency?
Kenyatta’s endorsement and support notwithstanding, he cannot guarantee a Mt.Kenya bloc vote for Ruto. To secure a bloc vote, Ruto would first need to pick a compelling running mate from the region and to mobilise overwhelming support from the region’s power brokers, who must endorse and robustly campaign for him. That presupposes giving the region a deal it cannot refuse.
The constitutional requirement that a successful candidate garners 50 per cent of the ballot might favour him. To be in government, the region needs a partnership that guarantees this threshold. Ruto’s argument would then be that it is the region’s turn to return the favour. It will help his cause if Cord remains intact, excludes Mt Kenya from its power formation, and fails to change the perception that it does not represent Mt Kenya interests.
Still, Kenya is a democracy. Voters have a mind and choice of their own, as do candidates. Mt Kenya voters might prefer another candidate. A strong Mt Kenya candidate might also run against him, denting his support in the region. The assumption here is that, like in the last five elections, Kenyans’ ethnic sympathies will trump rationality in electoral choices. It is nothing unique to Mt Kenya.
It is, therefore, imperative that Ruto not only courts the Mt Kenya vote – a bankable bet if Jubilee remains intact – but also aggressively builds a cross-country support base. This should in any case be his Plan B. He must maintain a strategically ambivalent stance on his potential running mate. The choice of running mate will be essential in securing a bloc regional vote from Mt Kenya or elsewhere, and he needs all options open.

The Rift Valley factor
Ruto’s ambitions for 2023 are stillborn without solid backing from Rift Valley. This is his currency with which to negotiate political partnerships with any potential allies. Remaining the top dog between now and 2023 in Rift Valley is non-negotiable.
The big hazard today is the resurgent grievances against the Jubilee headquarters by both the region’s elite as well as its grassroots. The matter’s crux is the perceived marginalisation of URP from the benefits of incumbency. The discontent is today less an immediate risk for Ruto than Kenyatta. In the short-term, reduced support for Ruto dents the region’s support for Kenyatta’s candidacy in 2018.
The imperative is, however, more on Ruto than it is on Kenyatta to stem the disgruntlement. Rift Valley is what he brings to the table. An escalation of the disgruntlement could see Rift Valley drift away from Jubilee. Today, there are already powerful individuals that front the restiveness. Left to simmer, the revolt might hit an irreversible tipping point, where the Rift Valley vote is divided between Ruto and one or several contenders. Ruto must aggressively tackle the revolt, sooner rather than later.

The incumbency factor
The 50 per cent plus one clause in the constitution creates an imperative for consolidation rather than disintegration within political coalitions. It is an early signal that almost halfway into Kenyatta’s first term, both coalitions remain structurally intact, problematic issues in either notwithstanding. Before 2018, the possibility of both coalitions collapsing and new configurations emerging is possible, but improbable. Equally important is that little concretely points to dramatic changes in either coalition’s support base.
This should raise a red flag for Jubilee. Has Jubilee effectively leveraged incumbency to consolidate itself, and roll back Cord’s support? This is critical, considering the downside to incumbency. Opposition parties tend to take anchorage on the government’s record, particularly its failures. Cord is already going hard on Jubilee, citing corruption, security and defence, ethnicity and inequitable distribution of national resources as Jubilee’s failures.
Failures in government come with the territory. If Cord is still in the opposition in 2023, the list of Jubilee’s sins today will have grown into a detailed compendium. Ruto, and not Uhuru, will be holding this monkey. Ruto needs to be able to name transformative initiatives the government has invested in, with the finest details of budgetary allocations, their impact, and how they affect the price of potatoes in 2023. More than that, he should be the face of these projects already. How compelling these are against Jubilee sins, would make or kill him.

Lame-duck factor
As 2023 approaches, Uhuru Kenyatta will enter a lame-duck phase. His influence within Jubilee, and within the civil service, a perennially underrated power player, will without doubt wane. Purely as a matter of self-preservation, individual actors will realign themselves politically, relative to Ruto’s chances of succeeding Kenyatta. It could get nasty for Ruto if Kenyatta declines to endorse him, or dismisses him as a non-candidate. Worse still, Kenyatta could do more damage, and use his lame duck to push through an unpopular policy decision that he previously could not without losing support.
In this scenario, it will be proof of Ruto’s naivety if he will not have future-proofed himself against Kenyatta’s lame-duck phase. At best, Ruto could persuade Kenyatta to informally handover the reins of government and the Jubilee coalition as early as 2021. It would make it clear to all that he is the new boss, and force early realignments. In any case, he should already begin building a critical mass of functionaries – in Jubilee and in government – who are entirely beholden to him, and who can forcefully effect a putsch against unfriendly civil servants and Jubilee rank and file.
In the meantime, though, Ruto has a long odious tail that encumbers him, makes him look like a gory monster, and scares off voters. No one consorts with a man with a tail. However painful, he must cut this tail. This tail is his association with corruption, which is becoming too frequent for even his best friends’ comfort. He needs to put away the array of court cases at home, or find a flak-taker to deal with it. In politics, you are guilty until proven innocent – mud sticks and a lie repeated several times becomes truth.
- See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/rutos-rocky-path-state-house#sthash.9lXsxjAX.K5xAW7iU.dpuf

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